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NOTES

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - AWARD TO A WAGE-EARNING
WORKING PARTNER

Plaintiff, a wage-earning working partner, received a small
portion of the partnership profits as remuneration in addition
to his wages. While in the course of his employment as manager
of the firm's bottling plant, he was injured. Plaintiff then
brought suit directly against the insurer of the partnership for
compensation. The district court dismissed the case, sustaining
defendant's exception of no cause of action, and the First Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.' Because of the conflict
between the ruling of the First Circuit and prior decisions in the
Second Circuit on the same issue, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Held, affirmed. In Louisiana a partnership is an
abstract, ideal being with legal relations separate and distinct
from those of its individual members. To construe the Workmen's Compensation Act so as to exclude from its provisions a
working member of a partnership would be an exceedingly narrow construction of the act and directly contrary to its spirit.
Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So.2d
515 (1956).
Workmen's compensation legislation 2 seeks to allocate better
the inevitable accident costs of industrialization and relieve the
worker from the full burden. Generally, the worker and not the
enterpriser is the primary object of protection.3 Nevertheless,
where the two personalities are in some way combined, coverage
has been extended, as in the case of a corporate stockholder employed by the corporation. 4 Similarly, in Louisiana the independent contractor, an enterpriser, has been granted compensa1. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 77 So.2d 183 (La. App. 1954).
2. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 198 So. 670, 673 (La. App. 1940):
"The Compensation Law is a separate and distinct law from any other or branch
of law and is governed solely by the provisions of the act creating it." See also
Puchner v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 198 La. 921, 5 So.2d 288 (1941)
(the common law forms of action are inapplicable to the compensation act) ; Scott
v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 6 So.2d 806 (La. App. 1942) (the Code articles do
not apply to the compensation act) ; Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 183
So. 86 (La. App. 1938) (compensation actions are not tort cases).
3. See generally MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION c. 4 (1951).
4. Franz v. Sun Indemnity Co., 7 So.2d 636 (La. App. 1942) (president of
corporation was also director of the funeral home) ; Staples v. Henderson Jersey
Farms, 181 So. 48 (La. App. 1938) (deceased owned one share of the corporate
stock) ; Hodges v. Home Mort. Co., 201 N.C. 701, 706, 161 S.E. 220, 223 (1931)
("[Olne of the fundamental tests of the right to compensation is not the title of
the injured person, but the nature and quality of the act he is performing." The
application of the "dual capacity doctrine" extends compensation coverage to an
enterpriser in a very limited manner by allowing an award to one doing labor
generally performed by regular workmen or employees.).
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tion coverage where he performs manual labor. 5 However, the
statutory amendment extending coverage to independent contractors was by no means intended to include all enterprisers.6
The failure to note the distinction between the enterpriser and
the workman has engendered varying conclusions as to the coverage of partners. The weight of authority as to the status of a
member of a general partnership 7 within similar compensation
statutes is clearly contrary to the instant decision." Prior to
this decision, Oklahoma was the only jurisdiction allowing recovery in the absence of special statutory provisions.9 A great
deal of the litigation over this issue is disposed of on the basis
of theories of partnership, 10 either as an aggregation of memWith the latter compare Mr. Warren's comment: "The language of the act
5. La. Acts 1948, No. 179, § 8, p. 490, incorporated in LA. R.S. 23:1021 (1950).
6. To allow the enterpriser to recover under the compensation act would be
to allow a system of self insurance where none was intended. The recent amendment of the act permitting the application of its provisions to independent contractors seems to have been intended only to broaden the classes of workers covered and not to include any enterpriser in coverage. See M4ALQNE, LOUISIANA
WORKMEN'S COITPENSATION 446 (1951). It should be noted that the act including
the independent contractor is constructed around the words "manual labor." La.
Acts 1948, No. 179, § 8, p. 490, incorporated in LA. R.S. 23:1021 (1950).
7. But see Albertini v. Lease, 54 Idaho 30, 28 P.2d 205 (1933) (partner allowed compensation award on finding that under special law a mining. partnership
was an entity) ; Carle v. Carle Tool & Engineering Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36, 114
A.2d 738 (1955) (compensation allowed to partner on the finding that a limited
partnership was an entity).
8. There is extensive reasoning of the problem in two first impression cases:
Penderson v. Penderson, 229 Minn. 460, 39 N.W.2d 893 (1949) and Chambers v.
Macon Grocery Co., 334 Mo. 1215, 70 S.W.2d 8841 (1934). For further cases to
the same effect see Brinkley Heavy Hauling Co. v. Youngman, 223 Ark. 74, 264
S.W.2d 409 (1954) ; United States Fidelity 8 Guaranty Co. v. Neal 188 Ga. 105,
3 S.E.2d 80 (1939) ; In re Montgomery & *Son, 91 nd. App. 21, 169 N.E. 879
(1930) ;Wallins Creek Lumber Co. v. Blanton, 228 Ky. 649, 15 S.W.2d 465
(1929) ; Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947) ;
Lyle v. H. R. Lyle Cider & Vinegar Co., 243 N.Y. 257, 153 N.E. 67 (1926). See
also HOROVITZ, INJURY" AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(1944); 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 222(a
(1941.
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A somewhat different situation was interestingly presented in Keegan v. Keegan, 194
Minn. 261, 260 N.W. 318 (1935), where the plaintiff was allowed to receive a
compensation award from the partnership of which she was a member for the
death of her husband, an employee of the partnership upon the finding of the court
that the partnership w as an entity. But thereafter in Penderson v. Pen.derson,
229 Minn. 460, 39 N.W.2d 893 (1949), when direct recovery was spqught by a
partner from his firm it was refused upon the conclusion that a partnership is not
always an entity.
9. Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n, 86 Okla. 13.9, 207 Pac. 314
(1922). See also Knox & Schouse v. Knox, 120 Okla. 45, 250 Pac. 783 (1925);
Ardmore Paint & Oil Products Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n, 109 Okla. 81, 234
Pac. 582 (1955). This line of cases is criticized thoroughly in Chamber v. Macon
Wholesale Grocery, 334 Mo. i215, 70 S.W.2d 884 (1934) and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Neal, 188 Ga. 105, 3 S.E.2d 80 (1989), and cited with disapproval in many other cases,
10. For. an examination of both theories and how they are used see the articles
concerning the Uniform Partnerships Act, see Crane, Th. Uniform Partnership
Act -A
Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REV. 762 (1915) ; and Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act -A
Reply to Mr. Crane'a Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REy. 158 (1916).
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bers or a separate and distinct entity. Other courts have adjudicated similar claims on the presence or absence of an employeremployee relationship without mention of partnership theories."
A few courts apparently see no incompatibility in recognizing a
parftheship as an entity and denying compensation to a claimAlit partner. 2 The use of such conceptual reasoning as a basis
for decision has been criticized in that the inherent nature of an
organizatioh should -hot completely replace considerations of
iMerit and p licy. 1" To alleviate the results of this course of
judicial reasoning, several states 14 have provided for awards to
A partner by specific statitory amendment. These provisions are
keierallylbaged tipoi s0ihe requirement that A partner b6 a Wakeearhmr in order to justify his claim. 1" In some instafices CoVerage
by statute is extended to a partner where he gives special notice
tb thb insurer 6 domffiission that he elects to be doieked. 16

Although Lohisiana courts i7 have consistently followed the
entity theory in other areas of partnership affairs,"s prior deci[b.P.A.] reminds us of the language of some political platforms. There is some
language which will please those who approve the aggregate theory. There is other
language which will please those that approve the. entity theory." WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 300 (1929)
11. In re Montgomery & Son, 91 Ind. App. 21, 169 N.E. 879 (1930) ; Wallins
Creek Lumber Co. v. Blanton, 228 Ky. 649, 15 S.W.2d 465 (1929),; Lyle v. R: H.
Lyle Cider & Vinegar Co., 243 N.Y. 257, 153 N.E. 67 (1926) ; LeClear v. Smith,
207 App. Div. 71, 202 N.Y. Supp: 514 (3d Dep't 1923).
12. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Neal, 188 Ga. 105, 3 S.E.2d 80
(1939) ; Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947)
LeClear.v. Smith, 207 App. Div. 71, 202 N.Y. Supp. 514 (3d Dep't 1923).
13. Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943). See also O'Neal,.An
Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership,9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 307,
470 (1949): "The use of the entity or aggregate conception is not helpful in
interpreting statutes or contracts . . . . Unwary courts often carry deductions
from a particular theory over into areas where such deductions properly have
no application."
14. California, Michigan, Nevada, and Utah. See note 30 infra.
15. See note 31 infra.
16. Miss. Laws 1950, c. 412, § 34, p. 507 (election of partner to be covered
evidenced by signing policy; see American Surety Co. v. Cooper, 222 Miss. 429,
76 So.2d 254 (1954)) ; 4 UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-143(4) (Supp. 1951) (notice
to commission required) ; WASH. REV. STAT. § 7675 (Remington Supp. 1949)
(see Johnson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 33 Wash.2d 399, 205 P.2d
896 (1949) (partner paid salary or wage is covered by compensation as employee
if notice is given to the director of labor and industries)).
17. Five states presently maintain a court method of settlement of workmen's
compensation claims: Alabama, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
Louisiana's use of the courts to adjudicate the claims has been criticized as being
inefficient. Vonau, Administration of Workmen's Compensation Cases in Louisiana, 7 TuL. L. REV. 217 (1933).
18. The first case apparently incorporating the fiction is Dick v. Byrne, 7 Rob.
465 (La. 1844), citing Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 153 (1835), which had adopted
the concept of Toullier. See O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership, 9 LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW .307, 470 (1949). See also Brinson v. Monroe
Auto. Sup. Co., 180 La. 1964, 158 So. 558 (1935) ; Succession of Pilcher, 39 La.
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sions on this question 9 have followed the prevalent common law
reasoning based on the aggregate theory,20 thus denying recovery.
Although the court of appeal 2' cited an array of authority2
2
pertaining to the inherent nature of a partnership as an entity,
it appears that its decision may have been influenced by the basic
policy considerations of the compensation statute.2 a The Supreme Court's opinion in the instant case brings out this latter

element more fully, and it would seem that the decision is explained better in terms of policy than by the entity concept. The
purpose of the entity fiction is summed up in the statement that

it is "not a premise to reason from, but merely a shorthand stateAnn. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887) ; Pittman & Barrow v. Robicheaux, 14 La. Ann. 108
(1859). But see Drews v. Williams, 50 La. Ann. 579, 583, 23 So. 897, 899 (1898)
("We are not of opinion that always, and in every case, the firm is a legal entity,
separate and distinct from its members) ; Davenport v. William Adler & Co., 129
So. 382 (La. App. 1899).
The commercial code was to have carried the articles applicable to the commercial partnership. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2823 (1825): "The particular rules,
by which commercial partnerships are governed, will be found in the Commercial
Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2852 (1870). The failure of the adoption
Code ....
of this code has caused difficulties concerning litigation relating to the commercial partnership. On this general problem see Morrison, The Need for a Revision
of the Civil Code, 11 TuL. L. REV. 213 (1937). See also Kimbal v. Blanc, 8 Mart.
(N.S.) 386 (La. 1829) ; O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 307, 453, 494 (1949).
19. Shows v. Employer's Lumber Co., 77 So.2d 72 (La. App. 1955) ; Harper
v. Ragus, 62 So.2d 167 (La. App. 1952); Wall v. Aldrich, 50 So.2d 680 (La.
App. 1951) ; Dezendorf v. National Cas. Co., 171 So. 160 (La. App. 1936). The
case of Savant v. Goetz & Lawrence, 160 La. 916, 107 So. 621 (1926), though
often cited for this point, does not seem pertinent. There there were two partnerships and the Supreme Court refused to set and allow an award because the
parties had contracted on a percentage basis and there had been no profits as
yet. The court felt that to set an award under such circumstances would require
the assumption of some amount which would constitute making a contract between the parties in violation of Article 1963 of the Code, since no remuneration of a specific amount had been agreed upon or earned. Note the language of
the appellate court quoted in the opinion: "We cannot fix wages under the law
on the subject of compensation . . . when there is no way under the evidence
whereby we can compute same by analogy or otherwise." (Emphasis added.)
See O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership,9 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 307, 467 (1949), where the author accurately predicted the instant
decision when the entity fiction would be extended logically.
20. 1 BATES, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 172 (1888) ; CRANE, HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIP 9 (1952) ; 1 ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS 118 (1916)
TELLER, PARTNERSHIPS 6 (1949).
21. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 77 So.2d 183 (La. App. 1954).
22. For the civilian concept see generally Crane, The Uniform Partnership
Act - A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REV. 762, 764 (1915) ; 1 ROWLEY, MODERN LAW
OF PARTNERSHIPS 127 (1916).
23. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 36 (1951), in which
the author discusses the "compromise character" of workmen's compensation. See
also Malone,

Workmen's Compensation, 12
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(1952) ; Puchner v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 198 La. 921, 5 So.2d 288
(1941) ; Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 183 So. 86 (La. App. 1938).
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ment of a conclusion. ' 24 The presence of an insurer in the instant case is another highly significant factor. It is notable that
the court of appeal 25 stated that the entity theory allowed plaintiff a cause of action even though the right to exercise it against
the partnership might be barred by special law. The appellate
court went on to state that any defense of the partnership was
personal to it and that plaintiff had a right of action against the
partnership's insurer. The opinion of the Supreme Court held
that the appellate court had correctly concluded that the plaintiff
stated a right of action against defendant's insurer. This device
is one which Louisiana courts have used previously in allocating
risks. For example, the defense of coverture has been regarded
as personal to a spouse and unavailable in a suit brought against
that spouse's insurer by the other spouse. 26 Further, the defense
of municipal immunity from tort liability 7 has been held to be
personal to a municipality and not available to a municipality's
liability insurer. To what extent the Supreme Court actually
intended to endorse this theory as expressed by the court of appeal is not entirely clear. After indicating the correctness of the
appellate decision, the Supreme Court continues in general terms,
as if to create the impression that a working partner should be
entitled to recover regardless of whether the suit be brought
against an insurer or the partnership directly. It is certain that
the instant case represents the proposition that a wage-earning
partner injured in the course of his employment has a right to
assert his cause of action directly against the partnership's compensation insurer. Whether this holding will be extended is problematical. However, the present amplification appears to be consonant with the underlying employee-weighted 28 factors of the
compensation law of Louisiana.
It is believed that the instant case should be supported in its
strictist holding that a wage-earning working partner can recover compensation from the partnership's insurer. An extension of this case to an uninsured partnership 29 or to a non-wage24. Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943).
25. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 77 So.2d 183, 188 (La. App.
1954).
26. Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) ; McDowell v. National Sur. Corp., 68 So.2d 189 (La. App. 1953).
27. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App.
1936).
28. See note 23 8upra.
29. It should be noted that in Louisiana's two prior cases squarely in point
there was an insurer who was made a party defendant but recovery was denied.
Shows v. Employers Lumber Co., 77 So.2d 72 (La. App. 1955) ; Dezendorf v.
National Cas. Co., 171 So. 160 (La. App. 1936).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

earning partner should be avoided. Restriction of the award to
wage-earning partners is supported by most of the statutes ° of
those states allowing recovery by a partner, since the award is
generally based upon wages-3 rather than enterprising profits.
Wages should here be understood to mean that remuneration
which a partner receives for his labors as a worker and not that
received as an enterpriser since compensation for the latter is
not properly within contemplation of the act. There is little reason, however, to deny an award for the former simply because
some enterprising profits are also received by the claimant. In
such a situation, although a partner's enterprising profits may
continue, his wage payments cease, and for these he should be
compensated.
Joseph G. Hebert
30. CALU' . LAhOR CODE ANN. § 3359 (1943) ("wages irrespective of profits")
12 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17:147 (1951) (same) ; Nev. Laws 1947, c. 168, § 10(d),
p. 570 (same). See note 16 supra for other instances of statutory recovery by a
partner.
31. But iee Kraffer v. Charlevoix Beach Hotel, 342 Mich. 715, 71 N.W.2d
226 (1955), where on the basis of the interpretation of the Michigan statute and
bn the finding that a pri6i agreement for premiums had been settled, the court
peimitted a husband of a husband-wife partneiship to recover compensation awards
although he was not receiving wages.

